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PAULINE KLEINGELD Kantian Patriotism
Patriotism and cosmopolitanism are often presumed to be mutually ex-
clusive. Defenders of cosmopolitanism often view patriotism as a dan-
gerous form of parochialism,1 and defenders of patriotism regularly
charge cosmopolitanism with advocating rootlessness and denouncing
family, community, and country.2 According to David Miller's recent as-
sessment, political theorists face a choice: "either to adopt a more heroic
version of universalism, which attaches no intrinsic significance to na-
tional boundaries, or else to embrace ethical particularism."3
In this essay, I aim to show that, at least for Kantian theorists, there is
a compatibilist strategy that avoids this dilemma, a strategy that com-
bines cosmopolitan universalism with the attribution of 'intrinsic sig-
nificance' to state boundaries. What is more, patriotism (of a particular
kind) can be shown to be even a duty on Kantian grounds, without this
involving the general principle that 'compatriots take priority.'4
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1. In her important defense of cosmopolitanism, Martha C. Nussbaum calls patriotism
a "warm nestling feeling" that is "very close to jingoism" and stands in the way of the proper
recognition of our moral obligations to all human beings in general. See "Patriotism and
Cosmopolitanism." in Martha C. Nussbaum et al., For Love of Country: Debating the Lim-
its of Patriotism, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), pp. 2-17, here pp. 14,15.
2. Benjamin R. Barber, "Constitutional Faith," in Nussbaum et al., For Love of Country,
PP. 30-37; Gertrude Himmelfarb, "The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism," in Nussbaum et al.,
For Love of Country, pp. 72-77.
3. David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 64-65.
4. This formulation, often used in discussions of these issues, goes back to Henry Shue,
Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1980), pp. 131-52.
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Kantians are better known as critics than as defenders of patriotism,
and they are often charged with being unable to handle agent-relative
responsibilities adequately.5 As a moral theory, Kantianism is commit-
ted to the cosmopolitan view that all human beings, qua rational beings,
are members of a single moral community. They can be called 'citizens'
in this 'moral world' because they are conceived of as free and equal co-
legislators of moral law and, as such, are analogous to citizens of a politi-
cal state. They have fundamental moral obligations to others regardless
of their nationality, language, religion, customs, and so on.6 In line with
Kant's conception of'cosmopolitan law,' Kantian political theorists typi-
cally defend a strong notion of human rights, requiring that certain rights
be secured under international law if particular states fail to protect
them.7 Finally, Kant and many Kantians defend the view that states ought
to submit to common laws by joining a league of states8 that promotes
peace (such as the United Nations). Some defend the view that this league
should not have coercive power to enforce those laws and that states
should retain their fuU independence and only voluntary compliance
with the laws should be required. Others have used Kant against Kant to
advocate strengthening the United Nations by granting it coercive mili-
tary power.9
Such cosmopolitan commitments raise the question of what room
Kantianism leaves for patriotism. If all humans are 'citizens' of a moral
world that transcends state boundaries, it might seem that the distinc-
tion between compatriots and foreigners ought to be regarded as irrel-
5. See, for example, Andrew Oldenquist's well-known essay, "Loyalties," Journal ofPhi-
Iosophy79 (1982): 173-93.
6. For a thorough defense of this position against skepticism and against appeals to
state autonomy, see Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979).
7. On Kant's notion of cosmopolitan law and its current relevance to international law,
see my article, "Kant's Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order," Kantian
Review? (1998): 72-90.
8. Whereas Kant calls this federation a " Völkerbund" lleague of peoples], what he means
is a league of states. He explicitly remarks that 'international law' would properly be called
'law of states' (Metaphysics of Morals, VI, p. 343). In order to avoid terminological confu-
sion, I will use the word 'state' instead of 'people' or 'nation' when the juridico-political
entity is meant. Page references to Kant's works are to Kants Cesammelte Schriften, edited
by the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-).
9. E.g., Jurgen Habermas, "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit oflwo Hun-
dred Years' Hindsight," in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal, eds. James
Bonman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge: MIT, 1997), pp. 113-53.
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evant for moral purposes. Moreover, if Kantian political theory assigns
so much importance to the establishment of an international league of
states and to human rights, it might seem unclear how any positive role
can be assigned to patriotism at all. In short, the dilemma stated at the
beginning of this essay may seem to obtain.
In response to this type of either-or, several authors have presented
broadly Kantian accounts of the compatibility of cosmopolitanism and
patriotism. Marcia Baron has argued that patriotic partiality is justified
from an impartial moral perspective if and insofar as similar partiality
would be permissible for anyone in similar circumstances.10 Alan Gewirth
has argued that patriotic partiality is justified in terms of a universalist
conception of human rights, namely, as the proper attitude of persons
toward states that impartially secure their right to freedom and basic well-
being (and this partiality is regarded as justified toward such states only) .u
A third compatibilist account is found in the view, defended by John Rawls
and leremy Waldron, that it is a 'natural duty' (in Rawls's terminology) to
support and comply with just institutions that exist and that apply to us,
and hence, that one ought to support and comply with one's own state if
it is just.12
None of these accounts, however, has been attentive enough to the
different moral modalities of patriotism. Some argue that Kantian cos-
mopolitanism permits patriotism, others argue that it makes patriotism
a duty, and still others leave the matter vague.13 None examine the ques-
tion whether patriotism might be permissible in some contexts and a
duty in others.
Discussions of patriotism are also complicated by the fact that the no-
10. Marcia Baron. "Patriotism and 'Liberal' Morality," In Mind, Value, and Culture: Es-
says in Honor of E. M. Adams, ed. DavidWeissbord (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1989), pp. 269-
300.
11. Alan Gewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism," Journal of Philosophy 85
(1988): 283-302. Gewirth notoriously fails to argue for the thesis that such particularity is
required, despite his stated intention to do so (p. 289). It is clear only that he regards it as at
least permissible.
12. The basic elements of this account have been defended by Jeremy Waldron and are
found in a somewhat underdeveloped form in John Rawls's Theory of Justice. See Jeremy
Waldron, "SpecialTies and Natural Duties." Philosophy^ PublicAffairs22 (1993): 3-30; John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 114-17, 333-42.
See also, George Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice," Philoso-
phy^ Public Affairs 23 (1994): 251-70.
13. For example, Stephen Nathanson, "In Defense of'Moderate Patriotism,'" Ethics 99
(19891:535-52.
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tion of patriotism is understood in different ways. For example, some
authors take patriotism to consist in loyalty to a particular nation.14 Oth-
ers think it is the love of political liberty and the institutions that sustain
it,15 or a matter of self-conception and identity.16 Still others let the term
refer to all of these or more.171 will suggest later that we should distin-
guish between three fundamentally different forms of patriotism and
discuss separately the compatibility of each of these with Kantian cos-
mopolitanism.
Finally, the Kantian reconciliation of patriotism and cosmopolitan-
ism has not gone uncontested. Several authors have objected that there
may well be a Kantian justification of states in general and of the duty to
promote justice in general, but that this does not show that I have a duty
of special allegiance toward the particular state that is 'mine.' Most re-
cently, John Simmons has argued that the Kantian argument for the duty
toward one's particular state is gappy. He formulates the objection in the
following way: " [E] ven if you had perfectly general duties to promote jus-
tice and happiness, say, and consequently duties to support just or hap-
piness-producing states, these duties would require of you that you sup-
port all such states, providing you with no necessary reason to show any
special favoritism or unique allegiance to your own just state, and pro-
viding none of those states with any special right to impose on you addi-
tional duties."18 This objection represents a challenge that needs to be
met if any account of Kantian patriotism is to be successful.
Therefore, a full account of the compatibility of Kantian cosmopoli-
tanism and patriotism needs to address these three issues. It should ac-
knowledge that patriotism comes in different versions and that the dis-
cussion of its compatibility with cosmopolitanism should therefore be
structured accordingly. Moreover, a full account should address the ques-
tion whether, according to Kantian cosmopolitan principles, patriotism
14. With AlasdairMacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Ronald
Beiner (Albany: SUMY Press, 1995), pp. 209-28.
15. MaurizioViroli, For Love of Country. An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
16. Charles R. Beitz, "Patriotism for Cosmopolitans," Boston Review\y.$ (1994): 23-24.
17. Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Cosmopolitan Patriots," in Cosmopolites: Thinking and
Feeling Beyond the Nation, eds. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1998}, pp. 91-114.
18. See A. John Simmons, "Justification and Legitimacy," Ethicsiog (1999): 739-71, here p.
753.
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is prohibited, permissible, or a duty. Third, insofar as it is shown to be a
duty, a full account should include an argument that shows why the ob-
ject of this duty is a particular country and not simply justice anywhere
and in general. In this article, I provide such an account. I do not, how-
ever, provide an independent argument for why we should be Kantians.
I. THREE VARIETIES OF PATRIOTISM
If one takes patriotism to be a form of chauvinism or takes cosmopoli-
tanism to entail hostility to all particular attachments, the two are in-
compatible. Neither interpretation is required, however. To begin with,
we need to avoid conflating very different kinds of patriotism. I see three
main types.
1. Civic Patriotism
Civic patriotism is found in the tradition of republicanism. The republi-
can state (res publica, commonwealth) is regarded as serving the com-
mon good of the citizens in the political sense. The citizens are regarded
as free and equal (and, often, as male and propertied) individuals who
are united in their pursuit of a common political good. Civic patriotism
is the love of their shared political freedom and the institutions that sus-
tain it. It manifests itself in civic activity on behalf of the political com-
monwealth, whether this takes the form of governing it, defending it, or
promoting the well-being of its citizens or the flourishing of the political
community generally. In this tradition, 'patriotic' and 'for the common
good' are therefore often used synonymously.19
This kind of patriotism is of an inherently political nature and is not
dependent on national or ethnic identity. In principle, persons could give
up their citizenship in one state in favor of that in another and become
committed citizens in their new state, in a way that it is not possible to
move from one national group to another. The factual possibility of such
changes depends on immigration and emigration laws, of course. But
the point here is that civic patriotism itself does not imply the notion of
19. See, e.g., the goals expressed in the full (French) name of the eighteenth-century
German "Société patriotique de Hesse-Hombourgpour l'encouragement des connaissances
et des moeurs." See Rudolf Vierhaus, éd., Deutsche patriotische und gemeinnutzige
Gesellschaften (Munchen: Kraus International, 1980).
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a nation in an ethnic sense. As Jiirgen Habermas has argued, it is com-
patible with ethnic and national pluralism, provided the ethnic and na-
tional traditions are not inimical to the ideals embodied in the political
commonwealth.20
Patriotism in this sense by no means requires an uncritical endorse-
ment of everything that happens in the political body to which one be-
longs. Indeed, to criticize social and political practices can be patriotic,
if this is intended to enhance the common political good by calling for
reforms.2'
Maurizio Viroli, in his book, For Love of Country, presents a historical
account of this form of patriotism and its role in the republican tradi-
tion. In his view, it is a mistake (and a dangerous one) to use the term
'patriotism' to refer to anything other than the love of a common politi-
cal freedom and the republic that sustains it. He regards the use of the
term in the context of nationalist discourse as a modern misunderstand-
ing that can and should be set straight.22
But whereas it is of the utmost importance to distinguish civic patrio-
tism from nationalism and to realize that rejecting the second does not
rule out endorsing the first, there is no value in quarreling about the right
to use the word 'patriotism.'23 Rather than ahistorically trying to claim a
single meaning for the term patriotism, one should acknowledge that
some terms change their meaning over time or acquire additional mean-
ings. In such cases, the point is not to determine which usage is wrong
and which is right, but to distinguish the different meanings carefully.
That the term patriotism came to be used differently, especially during
20. Habermas also shows that this kind of patriotism may lead citizens to lower rather
than raise the threshold for immigration. See Jiirgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National
Identity," in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT, 1996), pp. 491-515.
21. Political criticism was so often presented as a form of patriotism that it even pro-
voked a book with the title, Opposition no Proof o f Patriotism, by William Arnall (London,
1735}- Cf. Hugh Cunningham, "The Language of Patriotism, 1750-1914," HistoryWorkshopiz
(1981): 8-33.
22. Viroli, For Love of Country, "Introduction," pp. 1-17.
23. Viroli's purist approach leads to problems even in his own historical account. Some
of the key figures in his history of patriotism use nationalist rhetoric. For instance, fifteenth-
century Florentine patriots defend imperialism and brutality in the name of their cultural
superiority and the nobility of their ancestors (for Love of Country, p. 27). Viroli relegates
this phenomenon to the footnotes while continuing to speak of these figures as defenders
of civic patriotism. A more balanced presentation would show that patriotism meant dif-
ferent things in different contexts, already in the fifteenth century.
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the nineteenth century, has been well documented.24 For philosophical
purposes, it is important to take note of such shifts and acknowledge, by
drawing the appropriate distinctions, that patriotism can mean different
things. This involves looking at the meaning of the term within the con-
text of nationalism and trait-based patriotism.
2. Nationalist Patriotism
Nationalist patriotism does not focus on the political commonwealth in
which one is a citizen, but on the national group to which one belongs.
What counts as a nation can be defined in different ways, e.g., in terms of
native language, cultural community, shared ancestry, common history,
or other factors, or combinations of these.25 Historically, the nationalist
tradition has tied 'patriotism' to the ideal of the nation-state. The term
came to refer to the devotion to and promotion of one's country out of
love for one's nation, with the assumption that a country constitutes the
political incarnation of a particular nation (as opposed to the incarna-
tion of a political ideal such as that of the republic). The nationalist tradi-
tion has been so successful in its appropriation of the language of pa-
triotism that in current literature the term is often used as a synonym for
'nationalism', entirely overshadowing the earlier meaning it had in the
republican tradition. Yet despite the historical prevalence of the equa-
tion of nation and country, the fact that nationalist patriotism is described
in terms of a concern for the political form of the nation also allows for
kinds of nationalist patriotism that are not directed toward promoting
the country in which one finds oneself. In many cases the borders of the
nation do not coincide with those of the country, as when several na-
tions coexist in one multi-nation state or one nation is spread out over
several states. In such cases, nationalist patriotism can be directed at
achieving effective national self-determination.
Typically, defenders of nationalist patriotism do not regard member-
ship in a nation as open. In part this comes with the way the nation is
denned: if lineage of some kind is part of the definition (as with a defini-
tion in terms of common ancestry}, it is impossible to switch from one
nation to another at will. But nationalist patriots also have another rea-
24. See, e.g., Cunningham, "The Language of Patriotism," pp. 18-27.
25. For purposes of this essay, it is not necessary to provide a more precise definition of
'nation,' nor to discuss the 'mythical' aspects of nations as commonly conceived.
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son for regarding membership in the nation as a given, not a choice: They
maintain that real patriotism involves valuing and being loyal to one's
nation as one's own. They distinguish sharply between, on the one hand,
valuing one's nation as one's own, and, on the other hand, valuing it ei-
ther because it instantiates some general ideal (such as the ideal of a
freedom-securing republic) or because one finds its particular traits ap-
pealing. Surely one's nation needs to have particular traits and be dis-
tinct from others in order to be meaningfully one's own. But loyalty to
the nation is not exhaustively described in terms of one's valuing certain
qualities X, Y, and Z, recognizing that one's nation happens to be or have
X, Y, and Z, and consequently loving and promoting one's nation because
of its valuable qualities.26 At least in part the fact that one's country is
one's own is a determining factor for one's preferring it to others. As
Alasdair Maclntyre puts it in an influential lecture, patriotism "is denned
in terms of a kind of loyalty to a particular nation which only those pos-
sessing that particular nationality can exhibit."27
Because the focus of this view is on the nation as one's own, instead of
as the instantiation of a general ideal or as the bearer of particular quali-
ties, there is no implication that one's own nation is better than others.
This makes it possible for current theorists in this tradition to distance
themselves from more pernicious forms of nationalism that do involve
such claims. Psychologically speaking, a shared culture, language, or
ancestry are often the preconditions for regarding the nation as one's
own and the means by which patriotic allegiance develops in a person.
This does not mean, however, that people must regard their own nation
as better when compared with others or that their allegiance should be
always unquestioning and unconditional.
The analogy often used in discussions of nationalist patriotism is that
between the nation and the family. This is based on the idea that the
family, too, is a social group that is not based on individual choice (for
the children born into it, at least) but that nonetheless often causes strong
bonds among its members and imposes certain special responsibilities
on them.
3. Trait-Based Patriotism
The discourse of patriotism also includes a third use of the term that
26. Oldenquist, "Loyalties," p. 183, and Maclntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" p. 210.
27. Maclntyre. "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" p. 210.
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differs from the preceding ones. This third kind of patriotism is the love
of one's country that results from reflection on or direct appreciation of
its qualities. I may come to love my country because it is beautiful; be-
cause my personal identity is connected with it in a positive way; be-
cause it enables me to live comfortably; because it has laws that pro-
mote my well-being; or because I recognize its laws as just or my fellow
citizens as virtuous. As indicated above, defenders of nationalist patrio-
tism refuse to call this 'patriotism,' but—as their own polemics indicate—
the term is used in this sense, and again it seems better to draw a distinc-
tion than to fight over the exclusive use of the word.
This third kind of patriotism does not by itself imply a shared nation-
ality or a particular political system (although it can of course be con-
nected with these). This form of patriotism may emerge even if one's
country does not have a political system that protects the freedom of
those who live in it and one does not regard oneself as a member of any
particular nation. It can be inspired by, say, the beauty of the land or the
fact that one's personal history is bound up with that country—as in the
case of the patriotism of immigrants toward the country that took them
in when no other country did. All that matters here is that a country can
have certain traits that cause (some of) its inhabitants to love it and be
active on behalf of it. These can be either traits that the country has inde-
pendent of its relationship to the persons in whom these traits produce
patriotism, or, if they do pertain to one's relationship to the country, facts
about or features of the relationship that cause one to love the country.
As such, particular traits might very well inspire love of a country in
people elsewhere, but then this love is not called patriotism. Patriotism
is the love of one's own country, and the love of another country goes by
a different name. French citizens who love France for its language and
culture are 'trait-based patriots'; Britons who love France for the very
same reasons, namely for its language and culture, are 'Francophiles'.28
The attitudes or activities to which trait-based patriotism might lead
in practice vary greatly depending on which traits are its basis. Patrio-
tism based on the beauty of the land may motivate different patriotic
activities than patriotism inspired by the love of a certain culture. Be-
28. From this perspective, it is beside the point to argue, as Maclntyre does, that trait-
based patriotism should be denied the label 'patriotism' on the ground that these traits
might also inspire love of one's country in foreigners. Maclntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" p.
210.
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cause patriotism is the love not just of the traits but of the country, how-
ever, it may lead to a wide variety of activities that transcends the con-
cern with the aspects that produced the patriotism.
II. PATRIOTISM AS A DUTY
This tripartite distinction does not by itself say anything about what these
forms of patriotism entail practically for one's attitude toward non-com-
patriots, and whether patriotism should (or should be allowed to) over-
ride countervailing duties and allegiances. Each of the three forms of
patriotism can degenerate into a fanatic variety, hostile to others in the
militant sense of "du/ce et decorum est pro patria wori." And each can
fade into a weak sentiment without practical consequences for action.
Tepid patriotism is trivially compatible with cosmopolitanism, and fa-
natical patriotism obviously excludes it, but there is ample ground be-
tween these two extremes.
The questions with regard to Kantian patriotism, then, are the follow-
ing: Can the Kantian consistently defend any of these kinds of patrio-
tism at all? If so, is patriotism a duty or is it merely permissible? And how
does it relate to moral and political cosmopolitanism? Specifically, does
one's citizenship in a particular state bring with it an obligation to give
preferential treatment to one's co-citizens in a way that runs counter to
the cosmopolitan assumption of the equality of all humans? Does not
cosmopolitanism, motivated as it is by universalism and impartiality,
require that state borders play no role? There are similar questions with
regard to differential treatment based on co-nationality or on trait-based
love of country.
If one were to advocate the creation of a world state, these questions
might seem to have an easy answer, at least as far as civic and trait-based
patriotism are concerned. In a world state, the patria and the global com-
monwealth would coincide, and thus the room for conflict would be
eliminated, at least at the theoretical level. But in the following I assume,
for the sake of argument, that the existence of a plurality of states is
justified.
To begin with, the assumption of the moral equality of all humans qua
rational beings does not entail that one has a moral or political duty to
treat every person on the planet the same (even if this were possible).
Certainly, according to a Kantian, there are minimal requirements that I
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owe to anyone and everyone to the exact same degree. I ought not to
deceive others, whoever and wherever they are; I ought not to violate
their rights, etc. And given the nature of such 'perfect duties,' no special
obligation will ever override them.
The situation is different, however, with regard to what in the Kantian
tradition are called 'imperfect duties', and one might think that the lati-
tude that exists for the fulfillment of imperfect duties can be used to jus-
tify patriotism. Well-established Kantian duties such as the duty to help
others in need, to promote the well-being of others, etc., can be dis-
charged in different ways and to different degrees. It is impossible to help
all the people who are in need, and one cannot help all equally well, and
this means that one must make choices. Kant himself says precious little
about how exactly to make such choices, but this is not an oversight.
Imperfect duties involve a duty to adopt certain policies of action ('max-
ims'), not duties to do specific acts. What such a policy would entail in
specific circumstances is a matter of moral judgment, and Kant explic-
itly states that it is not possible for the moral educator (or moral theorist,
by implication) to decide how imperfect duties should be discharged.
Any further principle in this matter would itself require moral judgment
in its application, and hence there is no way around moral judgment.29
Moral judgment is the power to decide what to do, given moral constraints
in the form of the moral maxims one has adopted and given empirical
constraints such as one's circumstances and talents.
Thus, imperfect duties leave a lot of room for moral judgment, as to
both what to do and how much. Moreover, the fact that it is an imperfect
duty to adopt the policy, say, of helping others in need means neither
that this is the only thing I should ever do nor that it is the thing I should
always do first. There are several such policies a moral agent should adopt,
and one cannot act on all of them all of the time. This in turn entails that
it is not per se wrong not to act, on a given occasion, on a maxim that it is
imperfect duty to adopt—as long as one has indeed adopted the maxim
and intends to act on it at other times.30
It might seem that this latitude should allow one to decide to focus
one's beneficence on one's compatriots or co-nationals. After all, if I have
to focus my moral efforts on some subset of humanity anyway, why not
29. Metaphysics ofMoralsVl p. 433, note.
30. For a good account of the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect duties,
see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell
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simply choose my compatriots or co-nationals? However, the mere fact
that there is latitude in the implementation of imperfect duties is not
sufficient to prove, in a way that does not beg the question, that patriotic
partiality is permissible.31 It needs to be shown how far this latitude ex-
tends and whether it allows for preferential treatment on the basis of co-
nationality and co-citizenship or whether such preference would con-
stitute a form of reprehensible discrimination against others.32 To this
end, I now examine each of the three kinds of patriotism in turn.
1. Civic Patriotism
To assess the status of civic patriotism, I start by examining the Kantian
justification of the state to see exactly where patriotic duties are said to
originate. This is to start the argument not from the question of whether
the people who are not the beneficiaries of my beneficent activities are
unjustifiedly passed over, but from the question of why states are impor-
tant at all. For we do indeed find an argument for special obligations of
civic patriotism in the Kantian account of why it is normatively required
to establish a just state, and the fact that this argument is premised on
the human right to freedom and the conditions for its protection will
turn out to be important for determining the relationship between pa-
triotism and cosmopolitanism.
The core of this account is the view that justice requires the state—
and not just any state, but a state that has just laws and the power to
enforce them. The basic idea is that in the absence of a just legal system
with coercive authority, no one's right to freedom can be secure against
University Press, 1992), pp. 147-75. On the issue of latitude, see also MarciaW. Baron, Kantian
EthicsAlmostWîthoutApologyQÛi&ca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 88-107.
31. In the absence of any such argument, one cannot provide an adequate reply to Paul
Gomberg's challenge that patriotism is as wrong as racism. See Paul Gomberg, "Patriotism
is Like Racism," Ethics 101 (1990): 144-50.
32. Marcia Baron argues that the justification of patriotism would "indicate that
thepartiality involved... is fine for anyone: the action taken is something that I think is okay
for anyone to take." She argues, similarly, that a defense of partiality toward my child might
take the form of saying, "It's my daughter, and I think it quite all right for anyone to do that
for his or her child." Baron, "Patriotism and Liberal Morality," p. 285. The fact that / tfunltthat
it's fine for anyone to do X, however, is not a complete justification without an account that
shows that the reasons I have for thinking this are good reasons and that I am not merely
generalizing my subjective preferences. The account that follows fills this justificatory gap
in Baron's argument.
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violence by others.33 Violations of the rights of others need not be the
result of mean-spiritedness. They can be committed even by people who
think they are no threat to anyone, who are "good-natured and justice-
loving" in Kant's words,3* but whose well-intentioned paternalism or un-
recognized prejudices interfere with the freedom of others.35 Therefore,
except perhaps for the lone individual who has radically cut off all con-
tact with humankind (if it is possible to do so), everyone ought to submit
to the public laws of a state that administers justice.
The view here is not that people choose to live in a just state out of
self-interest or that the state derives its normative authority from the
consent of its citizens.36 Rather, the view is that humans have a right to
external freedom; that the protection of this right can be secured only
institutionally, by a just state; and hence that people ought to leave the
state of nature and establish a just state, or—more relevant for present-
day purposes—be good citizens of the ones in which they find them-
selves. It might indeed also be in people's self-interest to form a just state,
and it could in principle be true empirically that people also consent to
being in a just state. But on the Kantian account, neither the beneficial
nature of the state nor the consent of the people subjecting themselves
to its laws is the basis of the legitimacy of the just state or of the require-
ment to establish it.
Still, there is some argumentative distance between the thesis that a
just state is normatively required and the claim that ƒ have a moral duty
33. Metaphysics ofMoralsVl, p. 312. Kant's argument hinges not on the empirical claim
that human beings actually do commit violence to others but that such violence is pos-
sible, a possibility that is given with freedom. Waldron assumes that without a just state
violence will occur, whereas Kant makes no such assumption; according to him, the sheer
possibility of violence, which is given with human freedom, is enough to back up the nor-
mative requirement to found a just state. For present purposes, this dispute is not impor-
tant.
34. Cf. Kant, Metaphysics ofMoralsVl, p. 312.
35. This might well be Kant's response to Simmons's objection that Kant leaves it un-
clear why "my mere refusal of reciprocal membership (in a state] (without any further wrong-
doing) constitutes any kind of injury to those who already have the security they desire
[i.e., who are members in a state]." (Simmons, "Justification and Legitimacy," p. 756).
36. This is important, not least because the defenses of the state in terms of benefits and
in terms of consent are often taken to be the only two strategies available for universalists
to defend patriotism. Significantly, David Miller shares this view and distinguishes merely
between a "voluntary creation" and "useful convention" approach ( Miller, On Nationality,
pp. 58-65). He fails to consider this third, Kantian strategy when arguing for the thesis quoted
at the beginning of this essay.
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to my particular just state, a duty that I do not have toward other states. It
might seem that the argument so far leads to a duty to promote just states
in general and anywhere, but that it cannot bridge the gap to a special
duty to the particular state of which one is a citizen. This is John
Simmons's objection mentioned at the beginning of this essay.
Jeremy Waldron has presented a detailed response to an earlier ver-
sion of Simmons's objection.37 His argument starts from the assumption,
mentioned above, that the pursuit of justice is a moral imperative, and
that there is hence a moral interest in the establishment of just political
institutions that can settle conflicts peacefully by arbitrating impartially.
He further assumes that the logic of the argument for this claim also sup-
ports the principle that there be only one such political institution in
each territory. Waldron then argues that the interest in there being only
one political institution per territory means that if there is a just and effec-
tive state in a territory that is the salient organization for this territory,
this is a sufficient reason for preferring it: "This is the organization that
deserves our support in the enterprise of doing justice if any organiza-
tion does."38
However, even if this argument shows that we have a duty to establish
just states, it remains unclear why I have a duty to "support" my particu-
lar state in any way that involves more than my merely refraining from
undermining it. Waldron's argument certainly provides good reasons why
I ought to obey the laws of the just country in which I am a resident or
citizen (a duty which I also have with regard to other just states that I
visit), but it is unclear why I should not be allowed to neglectthe state in
which I nonvoluntarily find myself (by being born a citizen, for instance)
as long as I promote justice elsewhere. This is a question especially if my
own state is already a just state and justice is badly needed elsewhere.
Perhaps it should even be regarded a duty to focus one's attention as
much as possible elsewhere in the world if one's own state is already just.
The principle would then be, "for the sake of world-wide justice, if you
are a citizen of a just state, focus your attention on making other states
just, without interfering with your own just state." Confirmation that
Waldron's argument has implications in this direction is found in the fact
that he hints at the possibility of there being any number of different
37. Cf. his essay, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," see note 12.
38. Ibid., p. 25.
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organizations, at home and abroad, dial promote justice and that there-
fore might have a legitimate claim on my support.39 Waldron's argument
turns not on my citizenship in this particular state, but on the idea that
my (just) state happens to dominate the administration of justice in the
territory in which I find myself. And this means that while I am in that
territory I should abide by its rules. It does not yield the conclusion that
1 have special ties or a duty of special allegiance to this particular state.
Waldron does address this problem to some extent by arguing that
what is special about my relationship to my own state is that I am "one of
the parties in respect of whose interests this just institution is just," i.e.,
that my state has principles of justice that are meant to be range-limited
and include me.40 Simmons might reply here, however, that the fact that
this state addresses me is not enough to oblige me. Modifying one of his
examples, he might object that if the bakery in my neighborhood is good,
effective, and the salient (dominant or most popular) bakery in the area,
and if it claims to bake bread for everyone in my neighborhood, this does
not oblige me to buy its bread.41 So it seems that his objection needs a
stronger Kantian reply, one that is able to point to a "special" connection
that I have to my state, a connection that is more intrinsic than the ap-
peal to the justice, effectiveness, and empirical dominance of a state in a
territory.
I believe that this can be done, and that there is an argument that closes
the gap between my general duty to promote justice and my particular
duty to my particular state. This argument starts from the idea, to which
Kantians typically subscribe, that a just state is a democratic state, that
is, a system of political self-government. A democratic state can exist only
when its citizens are committed to its institutions, at least to a minimal
degree. It does not just need citizens who comply with the laws and pay
their taxes. In addition, a just and democratic state also needs the politi-
cal involvement of citizens in order for democracy to function properly.
What exactly is required from the citizens will depend on the further de-
tails of one's view of democracy, and the demands will be greater on the
more republican-oriented views than on the more liberal ones. What
matters here is only that it is more than nothing. In this crucial respect,
die democratic state is very unlike the "business in my neighborhood,"
39. Ibid., p. 30.
40. Ibid., p. 19.
4L Simmons's example is found in "Justification and Legitimacy," p. 752.
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whose services I may or may not decide to buy, to use Simmons's anal-
ogy. Instead, citizens are essential parts of the just and democratic state,
and they are essential to its proper functioning.42
In a discussion of Simmons's objection, Samuel Scheffler anticipates
the appeal to citizenship and argues that this would lead to internal ten-
sions in the account. It would not yield a coherent defense of a special
duty to my particular state in terms of a general natural duty to support
just institutions. Instead, Scheffler argues, the appeal to citizenship would
have the unwanted effect of pushing the allegedly natural duty in the
direction of an associative duty. For it would now seem that it is a citizen's
relationship to the state that generates the duty. Thus, if the defender of
the natural duty approach answers Simmons with an appeal to citizen-
ship, the duty turns out to be the product of two radically different fac-
tors that tend in different directions:
The first factor is justice itself, whose tendency is to suggest a
nonparticularized duty to support just institutions generally. The sec-
ond factor, which is the particularizing factor, is the individual's rela-
tionship to a specific set of institutions. What may seem unclear, how-
ever, is why this second, particularizing tendency should take prece-
dence over the putatively universal claims of justice.43
Scheffler takes this difficulty to be a testimony to the inherent insta-
bility of the natural duty view of political obligation, and he regards this
instability as a. symptom of a broader tension within liberal theory.44
42. Kant himself discusses these matters in terms of'republicanism,' not 'democracy,'
because he does not advocate general adult suffrage. Moreover, he regards democracy as a
despotic political system in which the people rule without a separation of powers (Per-
petual Peace VIII, p. 352). In Kant's terminology, what we mean by democracy today is a
'republic' with general adult suffrage and with a more clearly worked-out system of politi-
cal representation than that provided by Kant.
43. Samuel Scheffler, "Liberalism, Nationalism, and Egalitarianism," in The Morality of
Nationalism, eds. Robert McKim and leff McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
pp. 191-208, here p. 197. The expression "may seem" in the quote does not, in this case,
anticipate a later exposure of the appearance as false.
44. Scheffler does not see this instability as a reason to reject liberalism. In fact, he even
regards it as a 'virtue' that liberalism allows for this tension, as it shows appropriate sensi-
tivity to important values whose joint accommodation is genuinely problematic. Scheffler,
"Liberalism, Nationalism, and Egalitarianism," p. 202.
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On the basis of the idea that the just state is a democratic state, how-
ever, a Kantian can answer the objection articulated by Simmons in a
way that avoids the problem noted by Schemer. The key to this answer is
the claim that it is not the mere fact of the relationship of the citizen to
the just state that drives the argument. One needs to add further consid-
erations to construct a successful Kantian argument that there is a duty
of civic patriotism. Rather than being denVedfrom the fact of the citizen's
relationship to the just state, these considerations help determine the
appropriate character of this relationship. Crucial to the argument—in
addition to the general premise of the duty to promote justice—is the
fact that a just state is a democratic state and that a democratic state is
inconceivable without the commitment of its citizens. To put it differently,
the Kantian answer to the objections raised by Simmons and Scheffler
should be that the alternative, a duty to promote just states without a
duty of civic patriotism, is incoherent.
The incoherence of this alternative is shown by the impossibility of its
universal adherence. If all citizens adopted the policy to be active only
on behalf of justice in general while remaining citizens of states to which
they pay no particular attention, no true justice and democracy would
be possible, because these citizens would in effect abdicate their role as
co-legislators. The problem here does not occur at the level of empirical
consequences, because it is an empirically open question whether people
will ever in fact disperse their attention in this way. Moreover, many ex-
isting democracies are quite functional even without the universal com-
mitment of all of their citizens. Rather, the problem is that such a policy
would be contradictory at a more fundamental level. It would be a policy
to promote just, democratic states for the sake of justice while at the same
time refusing to do what is necessary for just democracies to function.
From a Kantian perspective the contradiction inherent in such a policy
shows it to be wrong. Of course, the duty of civic patriotism does not
prohibit one from trying to promote just states elsewhere—quite the
contrary, as I shall show later. But promoting justice elsewhere should
not lead one to renounce one's civic duty toward the just and democratic
country of which one is a citizen.
This argument supports a negative (perfect) duty not to neglect the
state in which one is a citizen entirely, and an equivalent positive (im-
perfect) duty to have some special concern for one's own state. The argu-
ment thus supports a positive duty to be concerned, for the sake of jus-
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tice, with (1) the preservation of the state in which one is a citizen (pro-
vided it is just); (2) its flourishing insofar (and only insofar) as a certain
degree of flourishing is necessary for the state to secure justice (bank-
rupt states cannot enforce their own laws); and (3) the functioning of the
state as a democracy, and the improvement of its institutions where nec-
essary (including such preconditions for effective political participation
as a good educational system).45 All this and more is necessary to main-
tain a just democratic state. Because circumstances and needs change
over time, states are not static systems. This means that even an already
just democratic state needs the continued involvement of its citizens in
order to be able to keep meeting the demands of justice. Which specific
activities the maxim of civic patriotism leads to in practice will depend
on the situation, on one's abilities, and on the specifics of one's view of
democracy. Whatever the details, however, the key point is that if a just
state is a democratic state, then the normative requirement to establish
just states implies a civic duty, however minimal perhaps, on the part of
citizens toward their particular just state, a duty that is not based on con-
sent or received benefits.46
Thus, on this construal, civic patriotic allegiance to the state is not
primarily a response to the good job the state has done toward the citi-
zens whose rights it has secured. Such recognition would require a focus
on how good or useful the state is to each citizen and turn patriotism
into a reactive attitude. Instead, the maxim of civic patriotism on the
45.1 restrict my discussion to the civic duty of the citizen in a just state. Even the duty to
a just state is in dispute, and resolving this issue first may help determine (in the future)
what the duties are of persons in despotic or somewhat just states.
46. Many theorists attach importance to special responsibilities being non-derivative
and fundamental, rather than being justified indirectly from universalist premises. Samuel
Scheffler claims that if special responsibilities are justified indirectly, this "drastically
demotels] such responsibilities in status and significance," and that the only account that
accords them proper status and significance is one that treats them as "ethically funda-
mental." The Kantian rejoinder is to say that this claim seems to rest on the problematic
idea that a conclusion of an argument has less 'status and significance' than the premises
from which it follows. What matters is that special obligations are theoretically justified,
not that they are justified immediately rather than mediately. The fact that special respon-
sibilities are not first in the order of justification does not mean that they are "ultimately
insignificant" in the eyes of the moral agent. Cp. Samuel Scheffler, "Family and Friends
First? Review of Martha C. Nussbaum et al., For Love of Country," Times Literary Supple-
ment December 27, 1996. pp. 8-9; here p. 9. See also, "Conceptions of Cosmo-
politanism," Utilitas u (1999): 255-76, esp. pp. 259-60.
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part of citizens is required from the start, so to speak, because it has as
its content the production of justice.'17
This is not to say that one has a duty to stay in the country of which
one is a citizen. Nothing said so far rules out the option of emigration,
immigration, and naturalization, and the determination of the moral con-
ditions for these options is a separate issue. What has been established is
that as long as one remains a citizen of a particular just state, one has a
duty of civic patriotism.
Moreover, the Kantian defense of civic patriotism does not yield a
justification for focusing one's beneficence on one's own state and its
inhabitants while failing to consider the needs of those outside it. In fact,
it says very little about beneficence at all.48 All that the duty of civic pa-
triotism comes down to is the duty to fulfill those special obligations to
one's (just) state that are necessary for it to function and improve as a
democratic institution of justice.
One might wonder whether a Kantian should not rather argue that
one has a duty to support some just democracy, but not necessarily one's
own, or that one should support that just democratic state that is most in
need of support. The answer turns on the term 'support'. There are some
ways in which one can work on behalf of democracies elsewhere, even if
one is not a citizen. But there is also a kind of 'support' that is essential
for a democracy to function as a just system of political self-government
and that it can get only from its citizens. The fact that citizens, qua citi-
zens, are essential to the workings of just democracies is the reason why
there is a duty of civic patriotism. The argument for this duty does not
rule out supporting another democracy than one's country of origin in
this way, but in order to truly do this, one would have to acquire citizen-
ship in this other country. In doing so one would acquire a duty of civic
47. This is a crucial difference between the defense of civic patriotism presented here
and the one provided by Gewirth. See Gewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism,"
pp. 298-302.
48. The argument is radically different from that presented in Richard W. Miller, "Cos-
mopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern," Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 (1998): 202-24.
His focus on the 'cost of lost social trust' and on providing aid-based incentives to the less
well off to secure their political cooperation leads to a line of reasoning that, while built on
the premise of equal respect for all, is essentially consequentialist. More importantly, I be-
lieve there are empirical grounds for arguing that the relationship between the rich and the
poor compatriots within a country mirrors that between rich and poor countries in more
respects than Miller thinks (pp. 213-14, 217-18), and hence I do not think that a profound
bias towards compatriots in tax-based aid can be justified along the lines sketched by Miller.
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patriotism toward the new country, which would now be 'one's own' and
cease to be 'another' country. This is to say that as long as one is a citizen
of a just democracy, one has a duty of civic patriotism to that particular
just democracy, whichever country it happens to be. In focusing on the
kind of support that just democracies need from their citizens in order
to function as democracies, the argument for the duty of civic patriotism
does not rule out also providing other kinds of support (in the first sense)
for democracies that are not one's own.
The argument also should not be misunderstood as a version of the
consequentialist argument that the best way to promote justice is to pro-
mote it at home. The argument does not turn on that empirical asser-
tion. Justice requires that states be just and democratic and, given the
intrinsic nature of democratic institutions, that means that their citizens
have certain duties toward their own states. Furthermore, civic patrio-
tism, thus understood, does not require one to regard one's own state as
better or more valuable than any other. On the account presented here,
no comparative claim is part of the understanding of civic patriotism
itself.
Finally, the duty at issue here is not primarily a duty toward my com-
patriots, and hence it is not a version of the principle that compatriots
come first. If, as a result of my civic patriotism, my compatriots receive
certain advantages that noncompatriots do not, this is not simply be-
cause they are my compatriots but rather because they are members in
the democratic political body that I have a duty to sustain and improve.
This makes it possible to avoid Andrew Mason's criticism of defenses of
patriotism, namely, that the nature of these defenses does not justify their
claim that one has duties to one's compatriots (and not to, say, perma-
nent resident aliens).'19 The argument I have presented leads to a duty
not toward compatriots but toward the just democratic state; and not
toward the state simply because it is mine, but because it is an institu-
tion of justice, and an institution of a type that requires the participation
49. AndrewMason, "Special Obligations to Compatriots." Ethicsmj (1997): 427-47. When,
as is here presumed, the just democratic state itself is conceived as a collective of individu-
als united for the sake of justice, one could also say that the duty of patriotism is a duty
toward one's compatriots. It is important to realize, however, that it is a duty toward them
collectively, as united into the democratic state for the sake of justice (and that this duty is
not based simply in the fact that they are compatriots). Even when construed in this way,
however, the Kantian defense of civic patriotism still gives good sense to the distinction
between citizens and residents and it thus answers Mason's challenge.
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of its citizens in order to function. Because the end is justice, residents
are included in the scope of my activities toward this end, as injustice
toward them should be avoided, too. It is true that this argument does
not assign the same duty of patriotism to resident aliens who do not fulfill
a crucial role for the working of democracy—and that is exactly the cru-
cial difference between them and citizens. Resident aliens may reside in
the territory only temporarily and hence not be committed to the state
in which they reside at a particular time. Of course, if they are so com-
mitted, Kantians would argue that there should be ways for them to be-
come citizens, provided they fulfill certain reasonable conditions. Finally,
the argument presented here does not rule out that resident aliens ac-
quire duties to the states in which they reside, e.g., because of their ac-
ceptance of benefits from this state, but the justification of such duties
would be different.
The argument just presented shows that citizens ought to adopt their
state's proper functioning as an institution of justice as one of their ends.
However, they ought to adopt other, cosmopolitan principles as well, and
this brings us back to the issue of how to reconcile patriotic and cosmo-
politan duties. The account thus far might still not convince those who
suspect patriotism and cosmopolitanism to be inherently in conflict. After
all, even if the argument above is sound, this might seem to lead to a
classic case of a conflict of duties. Showing that we have a duty of civic
patriotism does not by itself suffice to show that this duty is compatible
with our moral obligation toward all other persons in general, so more
argument is needed.
Here, the Kantian reply has three parts. The first draws on what was
said earlier about civic patriotic duty not being a blank check for prefer-
ential treatment of one's own state. Perfect duties set clear constraints.
For example, I should not procure the means for discharging my civic
duty by deceiving others or by violating their right to freedom. If I do, the
resources that I use for fulfilling my duty are indeed unjustly withheld
from others. The positive duty of civic patriotism is an imperfect duty
and as such must yield to perfect duties; the two kinds of duties cannot
be in conflict.
A second part of the answer is to point out that the very same duty of
civic patriotism applies to citizens of other just states: they have a patri-
otic duty to their state, and they have to withhold some of their benefi-
cent efforts from me to do so. It would be wrong for me to reserve the
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right to pay special attention to my own state while denying this right to
others elsewhere. But as long as I allow for symmetry, my civic patrio-
tism is not a source of injustice toward others. What is more, on the view
here outlined, it is even desiraWethat people elsewhere adopt the maxim
of civic patriotism. After all, the duty of civic patriotism aims to promote
justice. Of course, it is important that states are not only internally just,
but also externally just: they should not harm each other but rather be
disposed to cooperate peacefully and pursue the cause of global justice.50
This is part of what it means for a state to be just, and thus also part of
the object of civic patriotic activity. According to this picture, then, civic
patriotism is itself instrumental in leading to cosmopolitan justice.
A third part of the answer concerns the compatibility of our imperfect
duties. Imperfect duties are not inherently in conflict with each other. It
is not the case, for example, that my civic patriotic duty is necessarily in
conflict with my cosmopolitan duties. I can easily think of many situa-
tions in which the two are compatible, or even of situations in which I
can fulfill both at the same time. For example, in striving to make my
own state more just, I can also strive to make it more just toward other
states and more respectful of human rights in its dealings with foreign-
ers.
Although these imperfect duties are not inherently in conflict, one
might think that there are many situations in which they conflict in prac-
tice. One might think that each duty comes with a set of actions that fall
under it; that different duties come with different sets; and then, when
one compares the different sets, conflict surely seems inevitable.
A much stronger account of imperfect duties, however, which avoids
this difficulty, is the account developed by Kantian moral theorists such
as Onora O'Neill and Barbara Herman.51 According to this account, differ-
ent imperfect duties should be thought of as constituting multiple con-
straints on one's moral action, and the task for moral judgment is to find
a way of acting that is compatible with them all. Some of one's moral
maxims limit one another: for example, one's patriotic duty limits one's
50. Whether, on Kantian principles, this peaceful cooperation should ultimately take
the form of the merger into a world state or that of a voluntary confederation of states does
not need to be decided here.
51. This argument is quite close to the account in Onora O'Neill, "Instituting Principles,"
in Kant's 'Metaphysics of Morals, ' ed. Nelson Potter and Mark Timmons, Southern Journal
ofPhilosophy 36. supplement (1997): 79-96, and Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral
judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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cosmopolitan duty and vice versa.52 What this means is that one ought to
discharge one's cosmopolitan duties in a way that does not run counter
to one's moral commitment to promote the establishment of states as
institutions of justice, and that one ought to discharge one's patriotic
duties in a way that does not contradict one's moral commitment to the
well-being of other human beings in general. This is why the latitude in
the fulfillment of imperfect duties does not license the policy to extend
one's beneficence exclusively to one's compatriots or co-nationals be-
cause they are one's compatriots or co-nationals.
If one adopts a view of moral judgment as the power to determine
right action under the guidance of multiple moral constraints, the fact
that agents have multiple maxims is not so much a problem as part of
the solution. One then conceives of moral deliberation not as a battle-
ground of competing claims, but rather as the attempt to keep in mind
various moral ends one has adopted and find a way to satisfy them.
It may not always be possible to act in a way that satisfies all of one's
moral commitments simultaneously. In specific situations, heart-wrench-
ing choices may be required, but that is no objection to this account of
imperfect duties and the role of moral judgment. After all, an imperfect
duty is a duty that it is not wrong not to discharge on a particular occa-
sion, as long as one has adopted the right maxim. Real conflicts of duties
pose a philosophical problem because a normative theory cannot con-
sistently require a person to act on incompatible maxims or perform in-
compatible acts. On the interpretation of the role of imperfect duties as
sketched above, however, neither kind of incompatibility is at issue. The
maxims of moral cosmopolitanism and civic patriotism are not as such
incompatible, and these maxims do not require us to perform incom-
patible acts. I have not provided a defense of the multi-state system, and
in that respect the argument here is incomplete. What I have shown is
that if there isa defense of the multi-state system, this does not present a
Kantian with a conflict of duties, because Kantian cosmopolitanism and
the duty of civic patriotism are compatible.
2. Nationalist Patriotism
One might expect that a parallel argument for a general duty of national-
ist patriotism can be constructed on the basis of the idea that the nation
52. See Kant, Metaphysics ofMoralsVl, p. 390.
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(or nationality) is a good.53 One might try to ground a duty to protect
one's nation and its flourishing in the view that our national affiliation
provides us with meaning and a sense of identity; that such meaning
and identity are necessary for a psychologically healthy or fulfilling hu-
man life; and that all moral agents would therefore wish to be part of a
functional nation. This argument would partially parallel the argument
made earlier in that here the idea is that if human flourishing requires a
world of nations, and a nation's existence requires a commitment on the
pan of its members to its core institutions or customs, patriotism in the
nationalist sense is a duty, at least insofar as it is necessary for the exist-
ence and functioning of a nation.54
Yet there is an important disanalogy between the two arguments that,
on the Kantian view, is fata] for this attempt to justify nationalist patrio-
tism as a duty. Whereas the duty of civic patriotism rests on the idea that
rational agents ought to have concern for their just democratic state for
the sake of justice, nationalist patriotism is here based on the contingent
fact that some people need a national affiliation for their sense of iden-
tity and well-being, without there being any proof that this is necessarily
so for all humans. It may be true that every human being needs some
social and cultural affiliation in order to flourish, but it is not the case
that all humans need to derive this from a nation—even when bracket-
ing, for the sake of argument, skepticism about the very concept of a
nation. Some people may indeed need a national affiliation, but others
do not, deriving their sense of identity and well-being instead from their
work or from a mix of different cultural elements rooted in diverse so-
53. This argument should not be confused with the defense of group rights or national
self-détermination. It focuses on the duty of the member of the national group towards the
group, not on the proper attitude on the part of others towards the group and its legal pro-
tection. For a defense of group rights, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Lib-
eral Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); for a defense of na-
tional self-determination, see Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determina-
tion," Journal of'Philosophy 87 (1990): 439-461.
54. Maclntyre goes even further than that and argues that patriotic loyalty is a "prereq-
uisite for morality." As I am here concerned with the question of whether a line of argument
based on the idea that the nation is a good can fit in a Kantian framework, however, I shall
not discuss Maclntyre's view, which is obviously incompatible with it. Instead, I concen-
trate on the version of this kind of nationalism that aspires to be called 'liberal.' This kind of
argument is found in YaelTamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993), esp. pp. 95-116.
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called 'national' traditions,55 Therefore, this argument does not generate
a duty of nationalist patriotism.
The fact that this argument does not ground a general nationalist pa-
triotic duty does not mean that cosmopolitans are justified in being in-
different to the well-being of those who happen to have the psychologi-
cal need for national identity. If it is true that some people need a na-
tional affiliation to ensure their well-being, this has implications for what
is morally required. Given the duty to help others in need and promote
their well-being, it is relevant to know the needs of other people and what
would increase their well-being. But any resulting duty to promote na-
tions (or a particular nation) in the service of the well-being of specific
others is just that: a means for promoting their well-being, not a duty to
promote a nation or nationhood per se.
Another strategy for providing the underpinnings for a duty of nation-
alism is to argue that I can help my co-nationals better than I can help
strangers and thus that prudence dictates that I benefit my co-nationals
instead of others. However, this argument fails for similar reasons. As an
empirical claim the premise is often false, as illustrated by the fact that a
charitable donation of $100 by a U.S. resident can often feed consider-
ably more people when spent in a poor country than when spent in the
United States. And even in cases in which it is empirically true that the
best way to do good is by helping one's co-nationals, if the reason one
helps them is that it is the best way to do good, this is again an instance
of acting from the duty to help others in need, not from a duty of nation-
alist patriotism.
Finally, one might try to adapt an argument from voluntary associa-
tions to the case of nationalism. The idea here would be, first, that the
right to freedom implies the right to form voluntary associations, as long
as these associations do not violate the rights of others. Because volun-
tary associations cannot exist without special commitments on the part
of their members, one thus acquires duties toward these associations
when one chooses to become a member. When put in the service of a
defense of nationalism, however, this argument does not yield a general
duty of nationalism. First, the nation is not typically conceived of as a
voluntary association. But even if national identity (or one's identifica-
55. This objection is elaborated in Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmo-
politan Alternative," University of Michigan loumal of Law Reform 25 (1992): 751-93.
338 Philosophy & Public Affairs
tion with a particular nation) is regarded as a voluntary matter, all that
the argument from voluntary associations leads to is the conclusion that
voluntary associations and the special obligations they imply are defen-
sible on Kantian grounds as long as these associations do not violate the
rights of others. It does not follow that all voluntary associations (nor
their concomitant obligations) are thereby justified. A mob, for example,
is not. Therefore, the argument from voluntary associations is not by it-
self enough to defend a duty of nationalist patriotism—one would need
a separate argument to show that the nation is a permissible kind of vol-
untary association that does not violate the rights of others. Third, even
if one could show that the nation is a permissible voluntary association,
all that would follow is that those people who voluntarily assume com-
mitments to a nation have duties toward their nation, within the bounds
of morality. In short, it would not follow that everyone has a duty of na-
tionalist patriotism. I do not see any other, more plausible way for a
Kantian to argue that nationalist patriotism is a duty.
3. Trait-Based Patriotism
One might perhaps expect trait-based patriotism to fare better than na-
tionalist patriotism. In contrast to nationalist patriotism, this kind of
patriotism is based on particular traits of a country, and this might war-
rant the expectation that one can appeal to these traits, especially if they
are forms of excellence, to back up the claim that such patriotism is a
duty. If one's country exemplifies praiseworthy traits, it might seem to be
entitled to one's love and devotion.
Yet the first objection raised against the argument that people's need
for national affiliation grounds a duty of nationalist patriotism also ap-
plies to much of trait-based patriotism. In all cases except cases of moral
or legal-political excellence, this form of patriotism is even more explic-
itly grounded in the contingencies of individual psychology than is na-
tionalist patriotism. I may love my country because I have a taste for a
desert landscape, my country happens to be in a desert, and my love for
its physical appearance happens to turn into love for my country. I should
not, however, expect everyone to share this taste, let alone presume that
the aesthetic qualities of a country can ground a general duty of patrio-
tism toward it.
What about countries that exhibit excellences of a moral or political
kind? Does it not seem that we ought to love our country if it has just
laws that are efficiently and impartially enforced and if it acts justly to-
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ward other states and promotes peace and justice for all? Or if it is popu-
lated entirely with Kantian moral agents?
I have argued above that a Kantian should indeed defend the thesis
that one has a civic duty toward one's state if it is just, but not for the
simple reason that it is just. The argument did not turn merely on the
state's being just, but on the conditions of the possibility for it being a
just democratic state. The main problem with the suggestion that a state's
excellence per se leads to a duty to love it (i.e., foster emotional attach-
ment to or perform activities on behalf of it) is that this would not be a
duty to love one's country, but a duty to love states with good traits, which
is something else. If one happens to live in such a good state, one might
confuse it with a duty to be patriotic, but this would be a mistake. Simi-
larly, the duty to help others in need does not equal a general duty to
drive my friends to the hospital, although under specific circumstances
driving my friend to the hospital is a way to help a person in need. In this
case, the argumentative 'gap' between the general principle and its par-
ticularization would remain unbridged.
III. PERMISSIBLE PATRIOTISMS
If we can now take the duty of civic patriotism to be established, the final
question to be answered is what room remains for permissible patrio-
tism, from a Kantian perspective. The term 'permissibility' can be used
in two senses. First, one can say that patriotic activity is 'permissible' in
the sense of 'not forbidden'. For example, it is not morally forbidden to
help others out of a natural feeling of sympathy. Such help does not have
any moral worth, but from a Kantian perspective it is not forbidden as
long as it is 'in accord with duty,' that is, in outward compliance with
what duty demands but done for nonmoral reasons. Similarly, patrio-
tism of any of the three kinds mentioned is permissible in this sense as
long as no rights are being violated and as long as one has adopted the
right kind of moral maxims from duty and acts on them at other times.
This patriotism has no moral worth, but it is not prohibited by Kantian
moral and political theories.
The requirement that nonmoral patriotic action be in accord with duty
is stronger than it may appear at first. Many past and present acts com-
mitted in the name of patriotism constitute obvious injustice to other
states and nations or the individuals therein—or even to individuals
within the state (historical examples abound, such as violence against
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Jews and foreign residents). Patriotism can clearly degenerate into a sec-
tarianism that denies the fundamental equality of all humans and at-
tributes a higher moral standing to compatriots or co-nationals than to
other human beings. Moreover, those who show more concern for the
survival and flourishing of their own state, nation, or compatriots may
well be violating the negative duty not to harm others or violate their
rights. This would be true, for example, in the case of engaging in ex-
ploitative trade practices that take advantage of the weaker economic
position of other countries.56 If the ignorance about the impact of one's
patriotic actions on others is culpable, the fact that one did not intend to
do harm is not a valid excuse.
Patriotism can be called 'permissible' in a second sense when what is
meant is that there is latitude as to how to discharge one's imperfect du-
ties, and hence that under certain circumstances a moral agent is free to
choose among several courses of action, each of which would have moral
worth, hi this sense, it is morally permissible for me to help my needy
neighbor or some equally needy distant stranger who appeals to my
beneficence. Other things being equal, both actions are morally worthy,
provided I do not violate other moral duties (including the duty of civic
patriotism) and provided I help from duty.
Now I think that there is a bit of room for real nationalist patriotism
and trait-based patriotism as permissible in this second sense, that is,
with moral worth. That space is opened up when moral judgment deter-
mines multiple courses of action as in line with one's moral commit-
ments. In that case, trait-based love of country or nationalist allegiance
may tip the scale. Imagine, for example, the following case. Suppose I
live in a state that contains multiple nations. Two minority nations are
threatened by disfranchisement, and I am a member of one of them. Al-
though I can work equally well on behalf of either, I can work on behalf
of only one, not both. I decide to engage in the struggle for justice, be-
cause it is one of my maxims to promote justice. But, by stipulation, I
face a choice over which nation to work for. In such a situation, it is mor-
ally permissible to choose to work on behalf of the members of my own
nation because I feel personally attached to it, and this will still count as
56. On the negative duty to do no harm to others, in relationship to patriotism and cos-
mopolitanism, and illustrated with recent examples of such violations, seeThomas W. Pogge,
"The Bounds of Nationalism," in Rethinking Nationalism, eds. Jocelyne Couture, Kai Nielsen,
and Michel Seymour (University of Calgary Press, 1996), pp. 463-504.
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fulfilling my imperfect duty to help others in need and hence as having
moral merit. In a case such as this, I help from duty, and thus I help my
co-nationals because it is a way to do good; but I help my co-nationals
because I feel a special attachment. Therefore, 'nationalist patriotism' is
the best way to describe this case. Even though my decision does not
stem from a general maxim to put my own nation first, national attach-
ment plays a crucial role in the decision making. Mutatis mutandis, the
same can be argued for trait-based patriotism. Thus, there is restricted
but non-negligible room for morally worthy trait-based or nationalist
patriotism. The fact that this result is much too meager for the taste of
many (if not most) defenders of patriotism is not by itself a valid objec-
tion.
It is important to note that the permissibility (in the second sense of
the term) of this type of patriotic action, as described in the example,
coexists with the permissibility of combating the disfranchisement
suffered by the other nation. The first type of action is not morally more
(or less) meritorious than the second. For instance, if one lives in a demo-
cratic state with a just and well-functioning political structure and one
does the things that are required of a citizen, it is not a priori morally
better to direct one's beneficent efforts to one's own country or nation
rather than to distant strangers to whose cause one is devoted. This also
means that in cases of morally worthy nationalist or trait-based patrio-
tism, the moral worth does not depend on the patriotism, but on the
agent's underlying maxim to help others in need, from duty.
Moreover, this defense of a narrowly circumscribed permissible pa-
triotism expresses a point in principle, other things being equal. How-
ever, other things often are not equal, and given the empirical circum-
stances as we know them, where nationalist and trait-based patriotism
often play pernicious roles, one may well judge that it would be better to
make a point of not following one's patriotic feelings if following them
might encourage the harmful patriotisms of others.
These and related issues of application require much more attention
than I have been able to give them here. They are issues, however, that
can be addressed only after it has been shown that Kantian cosmopoli-
tan moral and political theories have room for patriotism—and showing
this has been the objective of this essay.
